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INTRODUCTION
“For most men most of the time politics is a series of pictures in the
mind, placed there by television news, newspapers, magazines, and
discussions. The pictures create a moving panorama taking place in a
world the mass public never quite touches, yet one its members come to
fear or cheer, often with passion and sometimes with action.”
—Murray Edelman1
There is a section of dicta in the recent Supreme Court decision on
health care reform that might portend new ground, although not in
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Rather, in his dissent, Justice Antonin
Scalia did a curious thing for those interested in statutory interpretation: He
cited an op-ed in The New York Times that quoted Senate Majority Leader
Harry Reid. Justice Scalia used this quotation as evidence of meaning on
the issue of whether Congress intended to draft a severable mandate, or
more specifically, why the Court should not interpret the fact that Congress
was silent as anything more than compromise.2 Of course, Justice Scalia
often hammers the sentiment that Congress is a messy business, full of
backroom deals and compromises,3 but his choice of source here is
illuminating. Though he repeatedly criticizes the use of traditional
legislative history to interpret statutory meaning,4 Justice Scalia rather
casually referenced a newspaper quotation of a senator regarding
provisions in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.5 This bit of
dicta poses an interesting question: Should the Court look to the public
statements of elected officials (outside of the Congressional Record) as
1. MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS 5 (Illini Books 1985) (1964).
2. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2675 (2012) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“Such provisions validate the [United States] Senate Majority Leader’s statement, ‘I
don’t know if there is a senator that doesn’t have something in this bill that was important to
them . . . . [And] if they don’t have something in it important to them, then it doesn’t speak well of
them. That’s what this legislation is all about: It’s the art of compromise.’” (second alteration in
original) (quoting Robert Pear, In Health Bill for Everyone, Provisions for a Few, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
4, 2010, at A10) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
3. See, e.g., Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509–10 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring).
4. Id. at 510–11 (“It may seem that there is no harm in using committee reports and other
such sources when they are merely in accord with the plain meaning of the Act. But this sort of
intellectual piling-on has addictive consequences. To begin with, it accustoms us to believing that
what is said by a single person in a floor debate or by a committee report represents the view of
Congress as a whole—so that we sometimes even will say (when referring to a floor statement and
committee report) that ‘Congress has expressed’ thus-and-so. There is no basis either in law or in
reality for this naive belief. Moreover, if legislative history is relevant when it confirms the plain
meaning of the statutory text, it should also be relevant when it contradicts the plain meaning, thus
rendering what is plain ambiguous . . . . [T]he use of legislative history is illegitimate and ill advised
in the interpretation of any statute—and especially a statute that is clear on its face . . . .” (citation
omitted)); see also Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98–99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
5. See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2675 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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evidence of meaning for purposes of interpreting ambiguous (or, in this
case, silent) statutory text?6 Is there a fundamental difference between
contemporaneous statements by senators made to media outlets and those
statements made on the legislature floor? How should these two types of
statements made by elected representatives relate to each other and to the
interpretation process?
This Article explores a normative proposal for statutory interpretation
in light of this media-saturated age. The proposal, referred to in this Article
as the Rostrum Principle, encourages the Court to interpret ambiguous
terms in legislation with a presumption toward the way the legislation was
“sold” to the public.7 Almost thirty years ago Professor Jonathan Macey
first identified the importance of holding legislators accountable for their
statements regarding the intended public benefits of pending legislation.
Holding legislators accountable for their statements discouraged what he
termed “hidden-implicit legislation,” where private parties lobby for
legislation specifically to benefit their private purpose while legislators
publicly hold the legislation out as benefitting the public interest.8 Macey,
however, limited his argument to statements in the legislative record.9
Although Macey’s argument remains as necessary and vibrant today as it
was then, the Rostrum Principle pushes hidden-implicit legislation even
further and focuses on the shifting public sphere, where such statements
are heard, debated, and otherwise held to account—that is, through the
media and popular debate.
As with Macey’s hidden-implicit legislation, the Rostrum Principle is
perhaps most relevant when there is a clear disconnect between the deal
struck by the legislators in the text and the “public marketing” of the law to
the electorate.10 There is renewed scholarly and popular interest in curbing
6. Lawyers make these types of arguments to the Court in their briefs, but courts are, to date,
wary of alluding to such sources of meaning in written opinions. See, e.g., May v. Cooperman, 780
F.2d 240, 264 (3d Cir. 1985) (Becker, J., dissenting) (“I believe that this evidence is very weak.
Community perception is simply too amorphous and unreliable to provide the ground for
constitutional decisions. The opinions and perceptions of the community are shaped by many
factors—editorials, personal biases, gossip, news broadcasts, and peer pressure, for example. Such
perceptions are thus unreliable indicators of what the legislative purpose of the statute in fact
was.”).
7. The term “Rostrum Principle” alludes to the elevated platform for public speaking
originating in Ancient Rome. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1083 (11th ed.
2011).
8. Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 232, 236, 243–44 (1986).
9. Id. at 233.
10. Cf. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892). The Rostrum
Principle in some ways speaks to the Holy Trinity conundrum, but instead of addressing the
disconnect between the “spirit of the law” and the text, it addresses the disconnect between the
“spin of the law” and the text of the law. See Carol Chomsky, Unlocking the Mysteries of Holy
Trinity: Spirit, Letter, and History in Statutory Interpretation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 949–51
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the influence of private interests’ hidden agendas over the legislative
process,11 and Rostrum provides a doctrinal mechanism for the Court to
address legislative process abuse in the popular discourse when it is
embedded within an issue of statutory interpretation.
This Article further explores the shifting public forum—away from the
Congressional Record and formal legal frameworks to include cable news
television, newspaper op-eds, and even Twitter. The explosion of popular
and social media and politicians’ increasingly sophisticated use of these
forms of communication goes far toward setting the debate regarding
pending legislation. At the same time, the saturation and accessibility of
these forms of communication may dissuade engaged voters from
researching legislative text or the Congressional Record and instead
become swept into the debate through popular and social media. This can
create more opportunity for private interests to shape a public message
while cloaking a private benefit, and legislators may not always be aware
of the spin.12 By supporting the public marketing, or “spin,” of the law
when confronted with ambiguity, the Court can reinvigorate separation of
powers by strengthening the voter’s ability to hold the legislature
accountable for its policy campaigns and, as Macey originally argued,
remove the incentive for such hidden-implicit legislation because the
private interest is made aware that a marketing bait and switch will not
advance the private benefit in cases of ambiguity.13
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I situates the Rostrum Principle
within an increasingly vibrant scholarly debate regarding how the Court
(2000); see also John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1287, 1309–
14 (2010) (arguing that “second-generation textualism” has destroyed any Holy Trinity leftovers);
Victoria Nourse, Misunderstanding Congress: Statutory Interpretation, the Supermajoritarian
Difficulty, and the Separation of Powers, 99 GEO. L.J. 1119, 1138 (2011) (using Holy Trinity to
show how meaning shifts depending on the audience).
11. See, e.g., Rebecca M. Kysar, Listening to Congress: Earmark Rules and Statutory
Interpretation, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 519, 531–32 (2009) [hereinafter Kysar, Listening to Congress]
(“Unlike these ambiguous implications of political transparency, the earmark rules aim to cure
deliberative distortions that occur from ignorance of the full content of legislation, a seemingly
uncontroversial and clear goal. If special interest projects are transparent, congressional members
and interest groups will have the opportunity to debate their merits.”); see also Rebecca M. Kysar,
Penalty Default Interpretive Canons, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 953, 955 (2011) [hereinafter Kysar,
Penalty Default]; Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in
Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 595 (1995) (“[T]he court assigns meaning to a
contested statutory term by using interpretive rules that are self-consciously designed to produce
‘democratizing’ effects—that is, institutional or social effects that correspond to a particular image
of democracy. I call this conception ‘metademocratic’ because it recasts statutory interpretation as
directed not only at assigning meaning in a particular case, but also at advancing a larger democratic
project.”).
12. See, e.g., Ana Villar & Jon A. Krosnick, Global Warming vs. Climate Change, Taxes vs.
Prices: Does Word Choice Matter?, SPRINGER SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, Aug. 19, 2010, at 1
(“[W]ord choice may sometimes affect public perceptions of the . . . policies . . . .”).
13. See Macey, supra note 8, at 243.
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should handle ambiguous legislative language. Part II discusses the
changing nature of the public forum and the role of media (both traditional
and social) in selling legislation. This Part also examines how the
aggressive marketing of legislation in popular media by the elected
officials themselves reflects upon the institutional balance between the
legislative and judicial branches. Part III defines the Rostrum Principle by
explaining what it is, when it would be most useful, and how it would
work by applying it to a case study. Part IV addresses anticipated criticism
and other limiting principles for the Rostrum Principle.
I. THE SCHOLARLY DEBATE
A. The Dominant Interpretive Framework
More than thirty years ago, Judge Guido Calabresi lectured at Harvard
Law School and argued that American democracy was “choking on
statutes” and that the legal system needed a comprehensive approach to
interpreting the new legislative landscape.14 Since that time, though there is
a renewed interest in theories of statutory interpretation, there is little
agreement on a dominant approach. A trio of guiding interpretive
methodologies—textualism, intentionalism, and purposivism—is debated
in law school classrooms, law reviews, and judicial opinions with no clear
resolution. Most scholars and judges agree that interpretation must begin
with the text of the statute.15 But from there, questions abound. When is a
text ambiguous?16 When is there a plain meaning of the text, what is that
meaning, and, perhaps most relevant for the Rostrum Principle, what
should courts do when the seemingly plain meaning of the words are belied
by the political or cultural history or climate?17
Depending on one’s overall approach to interpretation, the use of the
plain meaning doctrine can prove a refuge or a mirage. Some of the most
14. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1–3 (1982) (from a series
of lectures given by Judge Calabresi as part of the Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures delivered at
Harvard Law School in March 1977).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 4–11 (1997) (interpreting the federal
Impact Aid Act). But see Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 106 (2007)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (“There is no reason why we must confine ourselves to, or begin our
analysis with, the statutory text if other tools of statutory construction provide better evidence of
congressional intent with respect to the precise point at issue.”).
16. Is “ambiguity” a word capable of two meanings? What if a word is seemingly plain on its
face but the history shows it is capable of another understanding—can history make a word
ambiguous? These are mostly unresolved questions among judges and scholars of statutory
interpretation.
17. The Supreme Court sometimes agrees that the meaning is plain, but then differs on what
that meaning is. Plain meaning can encompass ordinary meaning or legalistic meaning—studies
find that textualists often apply legalistic meanings. See Miranda McGowan, Do as I Do, Not as I
Say: An Empirical Investigation of Justice Scalia’s Ordinary Meaning Method of Statutory
Interpretation, 78 MISS. L.J. 129, 143 (2008).
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strident textualists turn their back on all legislative history when
interpreting legislation, yet even they concede that language is contextual.18
The context of choice for these textualists is found in dictionaries,
precedent, and the traditional canons of construction.19 Purposivists and
intentionalists, on the other hand, consult a wider range of evidence when
assessing context. They often rely heavily on the legislative record
(consisting of committee reports, floor speeches, and the evolution of the
text through drafts) as indications of what the legislature intended to
address by passing the legislation.20
Some of the most polarized debates in assessing context are waged over
the use of legislative history.21 Those who promote such evidence as a way
to contextualize ambiguous text do so as a proxy for deciphering the
purpose of the legislation, or the legislators’ intent in passing the pending
legislation at the time their vote was rendered.22 Critics of legislative
history charge that using legislative history is piecemeal and often
politicized and as such offers no indication of Congress’s collective
intent.23 Accordingly, for textualists, the only constitutionally acceptable
tools of interpretation for the Court are the words of the text itself, or “the
deal that was struck.”24
Textualists are generally wary when the Court consults extratextual
tools, especially the legislative record, when interpreting ambiguous

18. See Bradford C. Mank, Legal Context: Reading Statutes in Light of Prevailing Legal
Precedent, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 815, 829–30 (2002); see also George H. Taylor, Structural Textualism,
75 B.U. L. REV. 321, 330–33 (1995).
19. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 69–75 (2012).
20. See, e.g., Amanda Frost, Congress in Court, 59 UCLA L. REV. 914, 925 (2012)
(reviewing reasons often cited by those in support of legislative history).
21. For an overview of the debate over the past eighty years, see SCALIA & GARNER, supra
note 19, at 378–83.
22. See Frost, supra note 20, at 925 (“For all its imperfections, legislative history, in the form
of committee reports, hearings, and floor remarks, is available to courts because Congress has made
those documents available to us . . . . [L]egislative history is the authoritative product of the
institutional work of the Congress. It records the manner in which Congress enacts its legislation,
and it represents the way Congress communicates with the country at large.” (alterations in original)
(quoting Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing
Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 306
(1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
23. See Manning, supra note 10, at 1293; see also Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing the reality of how legislative history is made).
24. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 544–51
(1983). But see Peter L. Strauss, The Courts and the Congress: Should Judges Disdain Political
History?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 242, 256 (1998) (“A judicial effort to discern and be instructed by the
politics of the enacting body would have, in addition to its evident risks, the virtue of referring
preferences and politics to that body the public elects, and can hope to control, for the exercise of
that function.”).
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language.25 Concerned that the Court can use legislative history to craft its
own desired narrative, textualists argue that such tools violate separation of
powers.26 These arguments are traditionally rooted in more epistemological
grounds—that is, Congress’s intent is not deducible. Even if it were,
Congress is a multimember body with many (and sometimes conflicting)
purposes.27 Justice Scalia therefore finds that the use of such tools is
judicial overreach.28
The recent turn toward originalism theory in statutory interpretation
infuses a focus on original public meaning to textualism and at first glance
looks similar to Rostrum.29 Justice Scalia described an understanding of
originalism as focusing on the public meaning of words at the time of the
Constitution’s drafting as a means to contextualize language for
interpretation.30 Justice Scalia juxtaposed this approach with that of the
intentionalists who focus on the subjective intent of the framers in drafting
the Constitution.31
Rostrum, however, differs in two important ways from the original
public meaning approach. First, Rostrum does not merely look to the
colloquial use of language at the time the law was drafted. Instead,
Rostrum is concerned with how the legislators chose to market the law to
the people, thus keeping a distinct connection between the legislators’
goals (not necessarily their subjective intent, but their publicly stated
intent) and the public meaning.32 Second, and related, is that Rostrum is in
the end more deferential to the legislature than original public meaning
theory. In Rostrum, the legislature has greater influence over how the
Court will subsequently interpret the law, so long as legislators are
consistent with how they present the law to the public and how they draft
25. But see, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012);
Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 631 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
26. See John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673,
707 (1997).
27. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Some Tasks in Understanding Law Through the Lens of
Public Choice, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 284, 284 (1992) (“[T]he concept of ‘an’ intent for a
person is fictive and for an institution hilarious.”).
28. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 19, at 18.
29. See Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576–77 (2008) (“Normal meaning may of
course include an idiomatic meaning, but it excludes secret or technical meanings that would not
have been known to ordinary citizens in the founding generation.”).
30. Id. at 576 (“In interpreting this text, we are guided by the principle that ‘[t]he
Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their
normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning.’” (quoting United States v. Sprague,
282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931))).
31. Id. at 605.
32. Rostrum attempts to incorporate what some call “cheap talk” or “audience costs” into the
interpretation process in the hopes of rendering such talk less cheap and by doing so strengthening
the electoral connection between legislators and their constituents. See Victoria F. Nourse, Two
Kinds of Plain Meaning, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 997, 1003 (2011).
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the law.33
However, as original public meaning purports to do, Rostrum also
removes the epistemological uncertainty because the “actual” intent or
purpose of Congress is not at issue with Rostrum, only the spin of the
legislation.34 The Court merely holds Congress accountable to the people
for the meaning it sold.35 The Court is not overreaching.36 On the contrary,
the Court merely echoes Congress’s public statements and punts back to
the electorate to ultimately weigh in on the legislative policy’s underlying
wisdom or goals.37
B. Statutory Interpretation’s Democracy-Forcing Role
The animating spirit behind the Rostrum Principle is part of larger
33. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 24, at 266 (“Considering the courts, too, as political
institutions whose misuse of authority must somehow be kept in check, in my judgment, requires
judicial acknowledgment of a partnership with the Congress. That acknowledged partnership must
be one that respects the general integrity of its processes (while mindful of the possibilities of
manipulation). It must accept that the Constitution . . . requires of it the attempt to discern and build
upon the public, political impulse of legislation. In such a context, the political history of legislation
cannot be a suspect inquiry. Even in doubting the coherence of the inquiry, we would have to
remember as well its importance as discipline for the inquirer; for the same insights that might make
us doubt the existence in reality of a public-regarding legislative purpose must also make us
extremely chary of judges who declare their independence of any inquiry into political history.”).
34. In this respect, Rostrum stems from Professor Bernard Bell’s exposition of a “public
justification” theory of interpretation. Bernard W. Bell, Legislative History Without Legislative
Intent: The Public Justification Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 60 OHIO ST. L. J. 1, 6 (1999)
(“[B]ecause members have a duty to consider the public justification of a statute when they vote, the
lack of a joint subjective intent becomes unimportant because members can be viewed as
constructively assenting to the text of the statute and the accompanying institutional explanatory
materials. Thus, the approach is objective, like new textualism, focusing on the reasonable
interpretation of text rather than subjective intentions of legislators.”); see also Cheryl Boudreau,
Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Statutory Interpretation and the Intentional(ist)
Stance, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2131, 2144 (2005).
35. See Paul E. McGreal, A Constitutional Defense of Legislative History, 13 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 1267, 1284 (2005) (“It would be strange indeed to ignore these public justifications,
offered to persuade the people and their representatives as to a law’s propriety, when later applying
that same law against the people.”); see also Bell, supra note 34, at 9 (“A legislature’s explanation
of a statute itself merits recognition as an act of legal significance. Two normative principles compel
such a conclusion. First, legislatures, like other governmental institutions, have a normative
obligation to explain, as well as enunciate, their commands. Second, government must not mislead
its citizens.” (footnote omitted)).
36. Kysar, Penalty Default, supra note 11, at 964 (“My own view, as I have explored
elsewhere, is that canons assuming the correct functioning of rules that the legislature sets for itself
are less vulnerable to the attack that the judiciary has exceeded its interpretive function.”).
37. See McGreal, supra note 35, at 1281 (“Specifically, bicameralism and presentment are a
process intentionally constructed to generate public debate about legislation. Consequently,
legislative history—which memorializes such debate—is a valued part of the process, not merely a
disposable byproduct left over after text takes its final form.”); see also Nourse, supra note 10, at
1120 (arguing that textualism should embrace legislative history as strengthening separation of
powers).
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scholarly and popular discussions about legislators’ accountability to the
electorate.38 In the mid-1980s, a wave of articles uncovered the separation
of powers benefits derived from judicial attention to the political history of
legislation.39 Almost three decades of strong textualism diverted the
conversation from process-oriented public law scholars and toward a more
formalist approach to the rule of law. However, in light of new uses of
media, this Article reinvigorates some of those discussions and argues that
courts should include legislators’ use of media and other forms of
marketing in “political history” and, moreover, that the inclusion of such a
use is consistent with a pragmatic understanding of the interpretative
process.40 Professor Abner Greene writes that “[a] deeper understanding of
social history can provide important insights into the legislative purpose
behind the statute.”41
As an institutional question, some scholars focus on Congress and
propose changes from within the legislature to hold Congress accountable
to the voter.42 Others look to the Court to take a more active role and
propose judicial review of the legislative process.43 Still others question the
utility of framing the underlying interpretive debate within the tripartite
framework of textualism, intentionalism, and purposivism and suggest
instead to move beyond these three theoretical approaches altogether.44
38. Brannon P. Denning & Brooks R. Smith, Uneasy Riders: The Case for a Truth-inLegislation Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 957 (1999) (advocating a truth in legislation
amendment); Kysar, Listening to Congress, supra note 11, at 524 n.15 (collecting sources of “prior
proposals” that “advance[] various statutory interpretation methods for special interest litigation”).
39. See, e.g., Macey, supra note 8; Strauss, supra note 24. Moreover, Professors Farber and
Frickey argued that public choice theory is consistent with an inquiry into legislative intent. See
Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423,
461–65 (1988) (describing a pragmatic approach to legislative intent that is consistent with public
choice theory); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 1007 (1989).
40. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 332 (1990).
41. Abner S. Greene, The Missing Step of Textualism, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1913, 1924
(2006).
42. Bernard Bell posits as part of his public justification method of interpretation that
legislators have a “duty to explain” the reasons behind the legislation. Bell’s theory aligns with
Rostrum in that it uses legislative history to evidence the public justification rather than the
subjective intent. It does not, however, appear to go beyond the more traditional legislative record.
See, e.g., Bell, supra note 34, at 76 (“The public justification approach seeks the reasonable
meaning of words rather than subjective intentions of those who approved the words. It is an
‘objective’ rather than a ‘subjective’ approach, but expands the text that must be interpreted to
include the institutional justifications for statutes as well as their text.”).
43. See generally Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, The Puzzling Resistance to Judicial Review of the
Legislative Process, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1915, 1970–74 (2011); Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, Lawmakers as
Lawbreakers, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 871 (2010) [hereinafter Bar-Siman-tov, Lawmakers as
Lawbreakers].
44. See Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation:
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Hillel Levin recently proposed a theory of interpretation based on
contemporary meanings and expectations.45 Levin argues that “the
behaviors and norms of the community, supported as they are by official
action,” should guide judicial interpretation.46 The “contemporary meaning
and expectations approach” advocates that how the community follows the
law shapes the law’s meaning.47 The Rostrum Principle is in some ways a
variation of this idea—elevating the role that the public’s understanding
plays in determining meaning—but the Rostrum Principle’s traditional
focus remains on the constitutional power to make the law and on the
statements and presentation by the legislators.
The search for a new framework that includes the normative goals of
increased accountability is supported in literature that addresses
interpretation issues that arise from ballot initiatives or other direct
democracy mechanisms.48 Jane Schacter addresses these forms of direct
democracy and explains, “The court assigns meaning to a contested
statutory term by using interpretive rules that are self-consciously designed
to produce ‘democratizing’ effects—that is, institutional or social effects
that correspond to a particular image of democracy.”49 Schacter terms this
use of statutory interpretation doctrine “metademocratic” and focuses on
how the interpretive process is useful for normative democracy-forcing
goals.50
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1861–62
(2010); Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of “Popular Intent”: Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct
Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107, 164–67 (1995).
45. Hillel Y. Levin, Contemporary Meaning and Expectations in Statutory Interpretation,
2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1103, 1116 (2012).
46. Id. at 1116.
47. Id.
48. Schacter, supra note 44, at 166. Professor Schacter concluded:
The traditional model of legitimacy in statutory interpretation reflects an
approach that draws a sharp distinction between the functions of the legislative
and judicial branches of government based upon the perceived demands of
democratic theory. The traditional approach demands interpretive “restraint” as a
way to enable the dynamic of electoral accountability to operate; voters can assess
the choices made by legislators only if those choices are clear and unobscured by
judicial choices covertly made in the name of interpretation.
The popular conception of law, however, calls into question the extent to
which the dynamic of accountability can operate. The problem is that voters
receive information about, and come to understand, legislative law from a
sprawling and diffuse set of sources—most prominently assorted media. As with
initiative laws, the meanings that voters attach to legislative laws and other
governmental policies flow as much—if not more—from ongoing, media-driven
processes than from the bare legal language of law or other formal legal sources.
Id.
49. Schacter, supra note 11, at 595.
50. Schacter, supra note 44, at 111–12.
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Similarly, Professor Victoria Nourse argues for reframing textualism to
account for the representational separation of powers principle. Nourse
points out the need for a theory of statutory interpretation that will embrace
legislative history as representative of the plain meaning and will thus
respond to the structural ambiguity a legislator creates by speaking to
constituents in a decisively prototypical manner and then drafting with an
eye toward the Court as audience.51 Nourse reinvigorates a separation of
powers perspective to the enterprise of statutory interpretation.52
C. Situating Rostrum in the Literature
The academic trend toward democracy-forcing proposals in statutory
interpretation signals discomfort with the current process. Rostrum is
based on similar discomfort. Current interpretation doctrines fail to address
the disconnect between the Court’s ex post interpretation of language
“sold,” perhaps unknowingly, to the public in a politically palatable light
but then written in an ambiguous or even contrary manner. In other words,
the text and context are increasingly divergent.53
Because public debate is increasingly partisan and increasingly loud,
Congress repeatedly applies a marketing gloss on pending legislation and
then the electorate votes according to the spin they have internalized.
Meanwhile, the Court is operating under a very text-based interpretation
scheme. This creates a disconnect between what the electorate thinks
legislators do and what the Court might interpret the actual text of the law
to do. This disconnect undermines the legislature’s democratic
accountability.54
This disconnect is concerning for several reasons: (1) the marketing can
51. Nourse, supra note 10.
52. Id. at 1170 (“The question is how shifting power affects power-defined-as-representation.
The representational approach ‘asks whether and how the shifting of tasks among governmental
players affects “who” will decide,’ where the ‘who’ is the people, represented by state, district, and
nation. Power is thus defined as the power of the people organized in ‘constituencies creating the
departments.’” (footnote omitted)).
53. Scholars argue that interpretation is generally a function of social context and audience,
and as such relies on an understanding of the three main interpretive communities: policy, politics,
and public. See, e.g., William S. Blatt, Interpretive Communities: The Missing Element in Statutory
Interpretation, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 629, 630 (2001) (“Statutes engage the following three distinct
communities: the policy community of specialized professionals found in government
bureaucracies, the political community of elected politicians, and the public community of the
general electorate. Recognizing these communities dissipates much of the confusion surrounding
statutory interpretation. Judges vary their readings of statutes depending on which community
comprises the audience for the decision, and rightly so. In a representative democracy, judges
usually should adopt the perspective of the community responsible for the issue.” (footnote
omitted)).
54. See, e.g., Nourse, supra note 10, at 1129 (explaining such disconnect as a “structureinduced ambiguity” caused by the need for legislators to speak in ordinary language toward
constituents and technical, legalistic language toward judges).
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actively misinform constituents if they fail to notice that the text is
presented differently; (2) the people are unable to hold their elected
officials accountable for the text if legislators’ public statements misinform
the people; (3) the legislature currently lacks an incentive to monitor the
disconnect between the portrayal of a pending law and the actual text on
which legislators vote; and (4) the Court, when faced with ambiguous
language, is left to consult dictionaries, canons of construction, and,
possibly, the legislative record. None of these tools for deciphering
meaning interact with the public debate that occurs before the law passes.
II. THE SHIFTING PUBLIC FORUM
The influence of special interests in legislation is certainly not a new
problem; almost every generation wrestles with the tension between
influence and democratic ideals. What recently changed is an increased use
of various media outlets as public relations operations for special interest
legislative agendas.55 In light of this explosion of media-savvy politics,
new dangers sprout: the legislator-as-talking-head, the coordination of
talking points, and the mass production of legislation by special interests
all combine to create a situation where the “public gloss” of legislation no
longer represents the law as written. Or, even worse, the legislation is
meant to obfuscate a very different private intent.56 Although the glare
from the media spotlight frequently blinds the public discourse to such an
extent that the electorate holds the legislature accountable for policies that
are not actually reflected in the text, the Court typically disregards those
same policies.
A. The Role of Marketing
There is much academic and popular discussion about the role of
marketing in electoral politics, especially post-Citizens United.57 The focus
55. See Schacter, supra note 44, at 132 (“These findings are not surprising given that ballot
campaigns are by no means the only political contests in which media and advertising play a
dominant role in supplying information and influencing voter attitudes. The mass media are widely
regarded as ‘the primary source of information about public affairs received by most citizens.’”
(quoting Michael Margolis & Gary A. Mauser, Public Opinions as a Dependent Variable: An
Empirical and Normative Assessment, in MANIPULATING PUBLIC OPINION: ESSAYS ON PUBLIC
OPINION AS A DEPENDENT VARIABLE 365, 366 (Michael Margolis & Gary A. Mauser eds., 1989))).
56. Id. at 166–67 (“[L]awmakers on all sides seem to have become ever more sophisticated
about the power of rhetoric and characterization, as evidenced, for example, by the strategically
chosen, sometimes ‘Orwellian,’ titles given to legislation. This pervasive ‘spin’ of law seriously
undermines the possibility of meaningful electoral accountability.” (footnote omitted)).
57. Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253, 1268
(2009) (“Politicians and interest groups can therefore potentially construct or manufacture ‘public
opinion’ that supports their preexisting policy preferences or use favorable polling data from
independent sources to move public opinion further in their favored direction. To the extent that
majoritarian preferences cannot truly be identified and followed by conscientious elected officials,
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generally remains on campaign spending and marketing of particular
candidates or attacking opponents through media.58 Similarly, there is
scholarly discussion about the role of media in ballot initiatives and
referenda.59 However, the legal scholarship contains very little analysis of
the marketing of particular pending legislation and the attendant discussion
of how a marketing campaign might relate to statutory interpretation
issues.60
The word “marketing” itself has many meanings. For purposes of the
Rostrum Principle, “marketing” is cabined to the statements that are clearly
attributable to elected legislators that are made during the time before the
passage of a statute and that explain the purpose of the legislation to the
public.61 Rostrum expands legislative history to include public statements
by legislators in certain forms of more popular media—specifically op-eds,
social media, television news, and cable network outlets.62 Its own
performance for evidentiary issues must limit judicial use of such popular
media, but the Rostrum Principle seeks to expand the universe of evidence
that the Court may rely upon to determine meaning with the goal of
holding the legislature to its publicly stated purposes and intents.
At first blush, the use of popular media to establish meaning might
appear radical. But if scholars and judges reframe popular media as the
current public forum, then it becomes not only natural but expected that the
way an elected official characterizes aspects of pending legislation on Meet
the Press or Twitter should help explain the context in which the Court
attempts to decipher meaning.63 The participatory aspect of new media—
the sharing of tweets and reposts on Facebook—amplifies the impact an
elected official’s marketing of legislation can have on voters.64 Studies
but rather are ‘crafted’ by public officials and other elites for their own purposes, the majority’s will
cannot serve as the autonomous constraint on—or focus for—decision making by elected officials
that is contemplated by the political accountability paradigm.” (footnote omitted)).
58. Bar-Siman-Tov, Lawmakers as Lawbreakers, supra note 43, at 830.
59. See Schacter, supra note 44, at 121.
60. For a comparative analysis of the role of interest groups and media in a case study of a
particular legislative history, see Yael T. Ben-Zion, The Political Dynamics of Corporate
Legislation: Lessons from Israel, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 185, 195 (2006).
61. For more on marketing of legislation, see Bruce I. Buchanan, Mediated Electoral
Democracy: Campaigns, Incentives, and Reform, in MEDIATED POLITICS 362, 362 (W. Lance
Bennett & Robert M. Entman eds., 2001).
62. See McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory
Interpretation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1994, at 3, 7 (“Signaling is, of course, a major
preoccupation of politicians. They frequently make speeches, issue press releases, publish policy
reports and studies, grant interviews, write constituents, and propose bills.”).
63. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 353 (2010) (“The great
debates between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists over our founding document were
published and expressed in the most important means of mass communication of that era—
newspapers owned by individuals.”).
64. CATHY J. COHEN & JOSEPH KAHNE, MACARTHUR RESEARCH NETWORK ON YOUTH &
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have shown that participatory politics are engaging today’s youth
demographic, and a large concern for users of new media is gauging the
trustworthiness of information.65
Rather than holding legislators accountable for their public comments
as a tool toward deciphering intent, however, Rostrum merely holds
legislators to their public statements as indicia of meaning on their face.66
Rostrum provides no mechanism for using elected officials’ remarks
against them or for otherwise attempting to impeach an elected official’s
character. Instead, Rostrum focuses on the public forum and the public
debate as they appear to the voters.67 The public debate is a proxy for
meaning; rather than relying on how a contemporaneous dictionary defines
a word, Rostrum allows the Court to use the definition swirling throughout
popular discourse—which the lawmakers themselves set into motion—
during the time leading up to the passage of the legislation in question. In
contrast to Justice Scalia’s original public meaning textualism, however,
the focus of Rostrum remains on the legislator’s role in setting the public
debate and thus on the chosen marketing spin that becomes the public
meaning.
B. Separation of Powers
As noted above, coordinated lobbying efforts toward passing specific
legislation are nothing new. However, the increased availability of media
outlets to express a coordinated marketing campaign and the ability of
certain coordinated groups to set the terms of the public debate through
disciplined use of talking points and marketing strategies skew the
electorate’s ability to hold elected officials accountable.68 The problem of
hidden-implicit legislation, so aptly discussed by Professor Macey,
remains. While Macey’s proposal that courts should defer to the “public
purpose” of laws when faced with ambiguity strikes to the heart of the
matter, it does not address popular media’s role as a forum for legislators
to disseminate the public gloss while writing the private intent into the
PARTICIPATORY POLITICS, PARTICIPATORY POLITICS: NEW MEDIA AND YOUTH POLITICAL ACTION 6
(2012).
65. Id.
66. Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2162,
2218–19 (2002) (describing an ex ante preference that does not encode a value judgment).
67. See, e.g., Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 76 F. Supp. 2d 16, 19 n.4 (D.D.C. 1999)
(noting the fact that legislation was sold a certain way but was enforced differently).
68. See Matthew A. Baum & Tim Groeling, New Media and the Polarization of American
Political Discourse, 25 POL. COMM. 345, 347, 359–60 (2008) (describing the new media as more
partisan and targeted to a specific audience); see also Michael X. Delli Carpini & Bruce A.
Williams, Let Us Infotain You: Politics in the New Media Environment, in MEDIATED POLITICS 160,
166 (W. Lance Bennett & Robert M. Entman eds., 2001) (“[T]he distinction between fact and
opinion or analysis is much less clearly identified by simple rules such as where it appears, who is
saying it, or how it is labeled.”).
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text.69
Should the Court support the “plain meaning” of the deal that was
struck even if it differs remarkably from the public marketing campaign
surrounding the legislation? This question shines light on why popular
media differs from the official record for interpretation purposes. While
granted the ability to decipher the law, the Court walks a narrow separation
of powers path between deciphering and creating meaning.70 This attention
to the Court’s role threatens to downplay the other part of the separation of
powers equation: the assumption that Congress is the most democratically
accountable branch and is therefore the branch with the power to make
policy (and that the electorate signals Congress through the vote).71 But
where is the accountability when members of Congress launch a full-force
marketing campaign around pending legislation, only to draft text that is
disconnected (either intentionally, through a series of compromises, or
through the inherent limits of language) from what Congress promised?
The electorate is removed from participating meaningfully in the process
and Congress is no longer the most democratically accountable branch. In
such a case, Rostrum posits that the Court buttresses separation of powers
principles by interpreting ambiguity with a presumption toward what
Congress sold to the electorate. By doing so, the Court strengthens the
process that keeps Congress the most democratically accountable branch.72
C. How The Media Differs from Legislative History
Traditional legislative history can provide evidence of the legislative
intent behind the resulting legislation and the internal processes leading up
to the final draft. As such, these traditional sources offer insight into
meaning and drafting history. But popular media differs in that it is meant
primarily for consumption, on a mass scale, by laypeople. Because of its
mass audience, popular and social media is simplified and proceeds in
broad strokes and sound bites.73 This feature lends itself well to marketing
and talking points, which is where a threat to democracy may lie.74
69. See Macey, supra note 8, at 227, 250–51; see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 364 (2010) (“Speakers have become adept at presenting citizens with
sound bites, talking points, and scripted messages that dominate the 24-hour news cycle.”).
70. See Nourse, supra note 10, at 1164–65.
71. See id. at 1175.
72. See id. at 1126 (acknowledging that even “political scientists who find no correlation
between people’s views on particular issues and representatives’ voting records, or who insist that
voters have the ‘haziest awareness’ of specific policy issues” still place immense value on the role
of the electorate to “check” representatives’ behavior through the vote (footnote omitted)). But see
Staszewski, supra note 57, at 1254 (stating that recent empirical work calls into question the
connection between any particular policy and its subsequent vote).
73. The simplified nature of the language used to explain legislation to the public should not
matter for its importance as an accountability scheme. For more on this, see infra Part IV.
74. See ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN
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Because of its accessibility, popular media also increasingly sets the terms
of the legislative debate.75
Rostrum also changes the use of legislative history, be it in the
Congressional Record or in the popular media. For example, Judge Posner
takes an expansive view of legislative history. He might include, for
example, a direct quotation by a legislator in a newspaper on a pending
legislative matter within the legislative history rubric.76 A handful of
federal court opinions do just that.77 However, in those cases, the courts
offer a newspaper quotation as a proxy for the legislator’s intent or the
purpose of the legislation.78 Rostrum provides a different use of legislative
history—where the courts use the public statement merely to evidence how
the legislators present legislation to the public.79 It is the communication
CITIZENS LEARN WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW? 227 (1998) (“The ability of voters . . . to make
reasoned choices and delegate successfully depends on whether their opportunities to gain
knowledge actually produce knowledge.”); see also Schacter, supra note 44, at 158 (“This influence
militates in favor of a narrow construction of the law, one that declines to permit ambiguous
language to work major changes in the law when there are strong reasons to doubt that voters
considered and approved specific changes.”).
75. See Will Rhee, Entitled to be Heard: Improving Evidence-Based Policy Making Through
Audience and Public Reason, 85 IND. L.J. 1315, 1324 (2010) (“[O]ne of the primary reasons for the
apparent paucity of evidence-based policy making in pluralistic democracies may be that opposing
sides in a divisive policy debate initially fail to clarify who is the target or incidental audience.”);
see also Sara Sun Beale, The News Media’s Influence on Criminal Justice Policy: How MarketDriven News Promotes Punitiveness, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 397, 442 (2006) (arguing that the
media shapes the public debate around criminal justice and increases support for punitive policies).
76. Richard Posner, Text of Judge Posner’s Response to Justice Scalia, THOMSON REUTERS
NEWS & INSIGHT (Sept. 20, 2012), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/
2012/09_-_September/Text_of_Judge_Posner_s_respose_to_Justice_Scalia/ (“[Justice Scalia] may
not consider such a historical inquiry to be an exercise of ‘legislative history,’ because he defines
legislative history very narrowly . . . .”).
77. See, e.g., Sherman ex rel. Sherman v. Koch, 623 F.3d 501, 510 (7th Cir. 2010) (assuming
for the sake of argument that the court should consider a press report as an example of legislative
history); Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265, 271 (4th Cir. 2001).
78. See Sherman, 623 F.3d at 510; id. at 521 (Williams, J., dissenting) (“There are troubling
statements in the record indicating religious motivations on the part of some of the Act’s supporters.
The bill’s chief sponsor, Senator Kimberly Lightford, said this to the press: ‘Here in the General
Assembly we open every day with a prayer and Pledge of Allegiance. I don’t get a choice about
that. I don’t see why students should have a choice.’”); Brown, 258 F.3d at 271 (“When asked by a
newspaper reporter about his intent in sponsoring the bill, Senator Barry responded that his intent
was not to force prayer in schools, but he added, ‘This country was based on belief in God, and
maybe we need to look at that again.’”). But see id. at 271 n.2 (“The parties disagree whether
statements to the press are admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule. We do not decide this
question but include this statement only for the sake of completeness. We do not, however, believe
that its inclusion materially adds or detracts from the views of legislators contained in the legislative
record.”).
79. See Nourse, supra note 10, at 1124 (“This means that legislative history should be
consulted not to find the intent of the legislature, but as a reference guide and a lexicon for
prototypical legislative meaning.”); see also United States v. Halifax Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 314 F.
Supp. 65, 75 (E.D.N.C. 1970) (“This Court has chosen to admit the newspaper articles for the
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itself as well as the audience’s reception of that communication that
determines how the Court should interpret meaning.80
Underlying the Rostrum Principle is a conception of separation of
powers that requires consistent dialogue between the public and their
elected officials. The Rostrum Principle focuses on expanding the Court’s
conception of the public forum from the halls of Congress (that is,
traditional legislative history) to the “Twitterverse.”
If the goal of statutory interpretation is to yield the most objective
reading of the statute as understood by those who voted on and are to be
governed by such laws, then examining how the debate was cast and vetted
through popular dialogue is a fair way to decipher that meaning. Society’s
modes of communication are rapidly changing and legal doctrine does not
always keep pace with such changes. Words acquire meaning through
context and the context of legislation is rooted in the public debate
surrounding the birth of that legislation. Given that the Library of Congress
is now archiving every public “tweet” ever posted,81 however, the
justification for allowing a senator’s statement on the floor of Congress but
disallowing the same senator’s statement to his constituents through The
New York Times or Twitter is increasingly flimsy. This rationale underlies
centuries of reference to the official legislative record. There is something
both obvious and necessary about using legislators’ own statements to hold
them accountable to the public. Rostrum merely expands the pool of
available evidence to include what is arguably more reflective of the public
debate in today’s times—television, print, and social media.
III. WHAT IS THE ROSTRUM PRINCIPLE?
A. Definition and Goals
The goals of the Rostrum Principle are three-fold: to encourage
Congress to market legislation in a similar fashion to how Congress
conceives the legislation; to put the voters on proper notice regarding
legislation and policy; and to encourage a functioning dialogue in the spirit
of democracy. A large part of any functioning dialogue entails trust, and
the voters are more likely to trust the cues they receive from legislators if
there is institutional assurance that the legislators mean what they say—the
judiciary will hold legislators accountable for what they say.82
purpose of showing that they did appear and not for the purpose of showing the truth of the
information contained in them.”).
80. See, e.g., Levin, supra note 45, at 1115, 1117.
81. Doug Gross, Library of Congress to Archive Your Tweets, CNN (Apr. 14, 2010, 5:31
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/TECH/04/14/library.congress.twitter/index.html?iref=al lsearch.
82. See LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 74, at 64–65, 75–76, 205–06, 208–09; see also
Todd D. Rakoff, Statutory Interpretation as a Multifarious Enterprise, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1559,
1574 (2010) (“[T[he point of view of those subject to the legislation—its readers—ought to count
for something. To put the matter in language more commonly applied to private documents, there
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The institutional restructuring posited by the Rostrum Principle
strengthens Congress’s proper role as policymaker by using the judiciary as
a guard against improper or incomplete dissemination of information to the
public.83 Rostrum gives the Court a means to monitor the legislature’s
dissemination of information to the electorate while respecting the
legislature’s ability to define policy. The Rostrum Principle provides
institutional confirmation that there is important normative value in
expanding the extrinsic evidence to include statements made by elected
officials to the popular media so that a court may refer to these statements
in order to decipher a text’s meaning. Rostrum ensures that the
interpretation is contextually appropriate and reflected in the public
forum.84
Almost all legal and linguistic theorists agree that language is
meaningless when divorced from context.85 The Rostrum Principle is
based on a normative claim that the relevant context for statutory language
is part and parcel of the democratic dialogue out of which the statute was
born. Context in this sense has two important audiences: the legislators
themselves, who set the terms of the popular debate through their public
statements,86 and the voters, who are governed by the statute and ultimately
must weigh in on the overall legislative policy choices carried out by their
representative.87 While the dictionaries and semantic canons used by
textualists also provide a sense of cultural context,88 as does the underlying
premise of purposivism (that is, understanding the mischief the law was
meant to address and thus its historical and cultural impetus),89 the
has long been a dispute between the ‘subjective’ and the ‘objective’ readings of statutory language.”
(footnote omitted)).
83. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124
HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1454 (2011).
84. See NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 48:2 (7th ed. 2007) (“Consideration of fairness weighs on the side of reading the
materials of legislative history from the vantage point of the public or those affected by the law. It is
designed to determine the legislative intent and the fact that a conservative organization was the
actual sponsor of the legislation does not mean there has to be a conservative interpretation. The
maxim that people are held to know the law becomes unfair concerning portions of the law which
are essentially undiscoverable. Basing decisions of statutory interpretation on historical events that
are, practically speaking, obscured from the awareness of persons not directly involved in the
legislative process has the character of enforcing secret laws.” (footnote omitted)).
85. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 108–09 (2001) (describing “new textualism’s” view of language in context).
86. And, in turn, the media and cultural understandings of language and contemporary
debates also affect legislators. See Schacter, supra note 44, at 165 (“Media sources such as
television, talk radio, and newspapers heavily influence legislators.”).
87. See SINGER & SINGER, supra note 84, § 48:2 (suggesting that the Court should give weight
to unofficial meaning attached by the public at large when considering issues of interpretation).
88. Especially when one makes a point of relying on a dictionary written contemporaneously
with the legislation. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 227–28 (1994).
89. See Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV.
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Rostrum Principle provides a context for language, and at the same time
reinforces a “metademocratic” norm.90
Professor Jane Schacter conceives of metademocracy as a form of
democratic legitimacy in statutory interpretation that has
emerged as the dominant essentialist view has receded. In this
conception democratic legitimacy is measured not by the
elimination of judicial discretion in statutory interpretation,
but instead by the interpretive principles and default rules that
shape and channel that discretion. Specifically, the court
assigns meaning to a contested statutory term by using
interpretive rules that are self-consciously designed to
produce “democratizing” effects—that is, institutional or
social effects that correspond to a particular image of
democracy.91
Using metademocracy as a framework, the Rostrum Principle is an
interpretive rule “self-consciously designed to produce”92 a mirror that
reflects the interpretive gloss that elected officials give pending legislation.
B. Rostrum and Current Statutory Interpretation Doctrine
One might pragmatically consider the Rostrum Principle a policy canon
like the rule of lenity, the rule of constitutional avoidance, and the
federalism presumptions. The Rostrum Principle could operate as a
normative prescription that strengthens institutional organization and
supports larger substantive goals.93 Scholars may introduce the Rostrum
Principle as a policy canon when: (1) there is an interpretive question
surrounding ambiguous text and (2) the parties have access to public
statements by the legislators made contemporaneously with the time of
enactment that evince public discussion of a particular interpretation.
Rostrum will not frequently come into play because much current
legislation was passed years before extensive media accessibility and
expansion. In other words, Rostrum is a canon in its infancy by its very
nature. However, in coming years, as the legislative process becomes more
L. REV. 630, 670–71 (1958).
90. See Schacter, supra note 44, at 112 (“The metademocratic approach acknowledges the
inevitability of interpretive discretion and the centrality of the rules used to resolve ambiguity,
focuses upon choosing interpretive rules that are self-consciously designed to address identified
problems in the democratic process, and links democratic legitimacy not to a mythic brand of
interpretive ‘restraint’ but to the use of default principles designed to further a larger vision of
democracy.”).
91. Schacter, supra note 11, at 595.
92. Id.
93. For an example of how these canons are added to the judicial toolbox, see Anita S.
Krishnakumar, The Hidden Legacy of Holy Trinity Church: The Unique National Institution
Canon, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1053, 1093–98 (2009).
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entwined with popular consumption of media and marketing, it is likely
that Rostrum will become more relevant.
Finally, the Court must play other roles to ensure proper democratic
norms, for example, by shining a light on legislative attempts to cloak
something unconstitutional as constitutional through carefully ambiguous
drafting.94 Rostrum does not foreclose such roles of the Court. Rather,
Rostrum merely envisions the use of public statements as a snapshot or
record of the public debate as evidence of the meaning of ambiguous
language.
C. Practical Applications of Rostrum
As discussed above, the Rostrum Principle will not apply to all
interpretive situations; it is seemingly best suited for recently enacted
legislation where there is a record of public engagement on the policies and
terms, or the legislation.95 Although the small universe of statutes that
might currently be eligible for this approach to interpretation might not
seem to warrant an entirely new interpretive canon,96 it can be expected
that, going forward, more legislation will be marketed through intense
public relations and social media campaigns. The Rostrum Principle can
help define the institutional roles early and hopefully reignite a vibrant
public dialogue about policy on the front end of the legislative process. In
other words, the Rostrum Principle formally adopts the implicit
understanding that public debate, and the norms and values expressed in
the public forum, matter for determining the context of ambiguous
statutory language.97
Recent opinions reflect that the courts are currently split on how to
address contemporaneous media statements as evidence of public debate.98
94. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2605–07 (2012). If the
interpretive dilemma faced by the Court is one with clear constitutional implications (such that
motivation or meaning might implicate constitutional concerns) then the Court is within its power
to expose such legislative mischief, and sometimes might need to resort to public statements to
evidence such mischief. But the use of public statements in this case differs from the use of such
statements under Rostrum.
95. See Elizabeth A. McNellie, Note, The Use of Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of
Popularly Enacted Legislation, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 176–78 (1989).
96. See Rakoff, supra note 82, at 1560, 1575–78 (arguing for a functional, multifaceted
approach to interpretation based on the type of statute).
97. Some have discussed this idea as a “duty to explain” to one’s constituents. See Bell, supra
note 34, at 9–20. This implicit understanding also is a driving force in current administrative law
doctrine, especially those recent doctrinal developments that celebrate reason-based decisionmaking and transparency. Cf. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 48 (1983) (stating that an agency must explain why it exercised discretion in a certain
manner); Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971) (holding that the
Court could require administrative officials to explain their decision).
98. See Madden v. Cowen & Co., 576 F.3d 957, 970–71 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing the public
debate surrounding an addition to a statute); Khodara Envtl., Inc. ex rel. Eagle Envtl. v. Beckman,
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Examination of these federal court opinions increasingly grappling with the
use of media for interpretation purposes is useful to understand how
Rostrum could work.99
Focusing on the federal system helps crystallize the boundaries that
must limit Rostrum.100 The goal of Rostrum is not to uncover any true
motivations of sponsors;101 rather it is to reframe interpretation of meaning
as one reflected most clearly, and perhaps most democratically, by the
terms of the debate in the public forum at the time of passage. Since states
vary in their legislative record-keeping and legislative processes, the role
of media and other public forms of debate could vary state to state.102
Expanding Rostrum to fit the variety of state interpretive precedents and
situations is outside the scope of this Article.
As discussed above, the use of newspaper quotes or other extratextual
media sources as evidence of some true meaning for purposes of
constitutional analysis is also outside the scope of the Rostrum Principle.
For example, a series of school prayer cases reflects a pattern of debate
about the limits of newspaper quotations by senators as evidence that
religious purposes motivate “moment of silence” laws. In the mid-2000s,
federal circuits grappled with whether these “moment of silence” laws
violated the First Amendment, and the circuits split as to the propriety of
using senators’ statements to the media to show the legislature’s
motivation for the legislation.103 This is different from using such sources
merely as proxies for the public debate.
Although a search of federal case law reveals that no courts currently
adopt an equivalent of the Rostrum Principle, an increase in dicta and
dissents seems to point to the use of extratextual materials to capture the
237 F.3d 186, 190 n.4 (3d Cir. 2001) (referring to a press release and newspaper article as
legislative history); Brooks v. Miller, 158 F.3d 1230, 1242 (11th Cir. 1998) (rejecting the use of
news articles as a source for determining legislative intent); see also Larez v. City of Los Angeles,
946 F.2d 630, 641–44 (9th Cir. 1991) (ruling that newspaper quotations were inadmissible as
hearsay in a civil rights case).
99. For definitional purposes, this Article confines the Rostrum Principle to the federal
courts. While state legislatures and state courts might benefit tremendously from the adoption of a
Rostrum Principle for interpretive purposes, the vast differences in organization and official recordkeeping at the state level are perhaps too diverse for broad interpretive theories.
100. Cf. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogeneity: How to Read a Statute in a
Lower Court, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 433, 437, 498–99 (2012) (looking at how lower courts interpret
statutes).
101. See Sherman ex rel. Sherman v. Koch, 623 F.3d 501, 510 (7th Cir. 2010); Brown v.
Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265, 276–77 (4th Cir. 2001).
102. See, e.g., In re Jason W., 837 A.2d 168, 175 (Md. 2003) (Harrell, J., concurring) (“As
apparent justification for recourse to such in the present case, Judge Wilner notes that, at the time of
the enactment of the 1970 law, ‘[t]he Maryland legislature had not yet begun [regularly] to preserve
committee files or to require written committee reports, so there is no official legislative history’ of
the 1970 version of the statute at issue here.” (alterations in original)).
103. See Sherman, 623 F.3d at 510; Brown, 258 F.3d at 271, 276–77.
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spirit of the public debate in order to shed light on ambiguous statutory
text.104 In at least a few of these cases, there is some discussion of whether
legislators’ statements to newspapers or press releases from legislators’
offices are valid evidence of public debate.105
In 2011, the Third Circuit used press releases from senators’ offices to
provide clues to Congress’s intent to interpret ambiguous wording in a
New Jersey law.106 In Lomando v. United States, one of the issues was
whether a New Jersey law requiring a plaintiff to submit an expert affidavit
alongside a claim for medical malpractice applied to a physician
assistant.107 The Third Circuit first found the statute ambiguous on this
question and then looked to legislative history for guidance.108 Relying in
part on a press statement from senators’ offices stating that “[t]he goals of
the final legislation were to ‘reform the State’s ailing medical malpractice
insurance system to provide insurance relief for doctors and ensure that
patients in New Jersey’ will be able to get the treatment they seek,” the
court read the statute narrowly not to include physician’s assistants.109 The
narrow reading in this case allowed the claim against the physician
assistant’s employer to proceed even in the absence of an expert affidavit,
and the case was remanded to the district court.110
In B & G Construction Co., Inc. v. Director, Office of Worker’s
Compensation Programs, the Third Circuit used a press release and a postenactment sponsor statement on the floor as “clues to Congress’ intent” in
wording a Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA)
Amendment to ensure access to benefits for those suffering from Black
Lung Disease.111 Examination of a series of amendments to the 1969
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act revealed a “congressional
seesaw” of sorts of which the latest amendment, inserted in the PPACA,
restored the rights of eligible survivors to continue to receive benefits after
a miner’s death without having to file a new claim for benefits.112 The
court found that the amendment was not ambiguous but used extratextual
104. See, e.g., Madden v. Cowen & Co., 576 F.3d 957, 971 (9th Cir. 2009) (pointing, in dicta,
to the fact that legislative history is belied by the “public debate” which seemingly points the other
way).
105. See, e.g., Lomando v. United States, 667 F.3d 363, 387 (3d Cir. 2011); B & G Constr.
Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 662 F.3d 233, 251 n.19 (3d Cir. 2011); Gonzales
v. City of Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093, 1107–08 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc), rev’d, 545 U.S. 748
(2005).
106. Lomando, 667 F.3d at 387.
107. Id. at 385.
108. Id. at 385–87.
109. Id. at 387 (alteration in original).
110. Id.
111. B & G Constr. Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 662 F.3d 233, 244–45,
250–51, 251 n.19 (3d Cir. 2011).
112. Id. at 245, 253.
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sources to support the reading of Congress’s intent to allow the claim.113
The court noted there is very little legislative history on the PPACA
amendment and continued to search for clues that ranged from the title of
the amendment, to a post-enactment floor statement, to a press release
from Senator Byrd’s office (the amendment’s sponsor).114 The press
release squarely addressed the issue before the court, stating in part, “For
widows of coal miners who [sic] spouses suffered from totally-disabling
black lung disease and were collecting benefits, they would no longer have
to reapply to retain their modest benefits.”115
Both of these examples couch the press release in terms of expressing
clues to the “intent” of Congress. However, as explained above, Rostrum
focuses on the metaphorical intent of any legislation, or the spin as
captured by its marketing. Perhaps the best example of judicial
examination of the principle embodied by Rostrum is captured in a Tenth
Circuit case the Supreme Court overturned.116 In Gonzales v. City of Castle
Rock, a wife brought a Section 1983 claim against the city and its police
officers after the officers refused to enforce a domestic abuse restraining
order.117 The interpretation question before the court was whether the
language of the state law (specifically, the use of the word “shall”)
governing such restraining orders required mandatory enforcement by
police, and thus created a due process entitlement to such enforcement.118
The majority used legislative history to support its reading that the statute
embodied a legislative intent to require enforcement of restraining orders.
The majority specifically referred to two newspaper articles, one of which
contained a pre-enactment quotation by a sponsor of the bill.119 As quoted
in the Rocky Mountain News, Representative Diana DeGette (D-CO)
explained, “We’ve basically completely revamped domestic-violence laws
in Colorado. . . . The message to citizens is ‘We’re taking a zero tolerance
in this type of activity.’ People who beat up their spouses, girlfriends or
boyfriends are going to be punished swiftly and severely.”120 The Tenth
Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss and
remanded the case.121
113. Id. at 249–51.
114. Id. at 250–51.
115. Id. at 251 n.19 (alterations in original) (noting the provisions that Senator Byrd inserted
into the bill).
116. Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc), rev’d, 545
U.S. 748 (2005).
117. Id. at 1096–98.
118. Id. at 1104–05.
119. See id. at 1107–08 (citing John Sanko, Stopping Domestic Violence: Lawmakers Take
Approach of Zero Tolerance as They Support Bill, Revamp Laws, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, May 15,
1994, at 5A).
120. Sanko, supra note 119, at 5A.
121. Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1118.
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What makes the Gonzales case a particularly compelling example is
that the Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit.122 Justice Scalia wrote
for the majority and found that the use of the word “shall” did not create a
mandatory enforcement duty.123 Justice Scalia derided the floor statement
used in support of the legislature’s intent to create a mandatory
enforcement for restraining orders, but he did not mention the press
statements.124
Justice John Paul Stevens and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented
from this interpretation of Colorado law, seemingly mindful of both the
need for deference to the federal court’s jurisdiction over Colorado on
issues of interpretation of Colorado law, as well as the undeniable policy
debates that spurred the passage of this particular Colorado law.125 While
Stevens and Ginsburg also did not mention the press statements, they wove
together law review articles, policy studies, and legislative and other
political history of the pre-enactment period to show the loud policy
discussion that mandated enforcement of restraining orders in the domestic
abuse arena.126 The dissent harshly criticized the majority for giving “short
shrift” to this political and cultural history and discrediting how political
and cultural history informs the reading of the language at issue.127
While Justices Scalia and Stevens seem to continue to debate their
long-standing differing views on interpretation—that is, whether or not
legislative history and other extrinsic evidence can ever capture a
legislature’s purpose or intent—Rostrum might break their impasse.
Here is how: By using the sponsor’s statement to the press about the
law providing zero tolerance, the Court can understand that the legislators
presented the public with this legislation as a new turn for the state—one
of mandatory enforcement in domestic violence restraining order cases.
Because the sponsor “sold” the legislation as such, the sponsor is
accountable for such policy to the constituents. The more examples of such
a marketing spin (or other public statements to similar effect), the easier
the Court can apply Rostrum. If the public feels strongly that law
enforcement needs to retain discretion in these matters, the public is now
122. See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 769 (2005). Two other recent
Supreme Court cases point to press releases and public official press statements as evidence of
meaning as well. See, e.g., AT&T v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(pointing to a press release as evidence of meaning, but from 1925); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554
U.S. 407, 452–54 (2008) (Alito, J., dissenting) (examining newspaper quotations and press releases
from state legislators regarding pending legislation in their states to capture “indicia of a national
consensus” with respect to child rape death penalty laws).
123. Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 750, 760–61.
124. Id. at 759–60 (discussing the Court of Appeals’ use of the legislative history as “sheer
hyperbole”).
125. Id. at 774–76 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 780–84.
127. Id. at 779.
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able to voice that sentiment through the electoral process. Because of that
accountability mechanism, i.e., the vote, the Court should approach any
question or ambiguity about whether the statute creates a mandatory
enforcement scheme with deference toward the ongoing relationship and
communication between the voters and the legislators. The Court need not
decipher any underlying purpose or intent on behalf of the legislature; it
merely needs to point to the public debate as presented in the
contemporaneous media accounts (and only that public debate clearly
attributable to the lawmakers relevant to the drafting and passage of the
particular law at issue). By deferring to the public presentation of the law,
the Court remains institutionally deferential to the legislature on policy
matters, while at the same time incentivizing a more transparent
transmission of the relevant policy discussion to the people.
IV. INTEGRATING THE ROSTRUM PRINCIPLE INTO THE CURRENT LEGAL
SYSTEM
Rostrum gives the Court a tool to apply in order to examine the public
debate and guide interpretation. Of course, Rostrum has boundaries. First,
Rostrum is limited to public statements by lawmakers, and only those
public statements on the record.128 This includes appearances on television
shows such as Meet the Press or other cable news network shows, the
legislator’s own press releases, Facebook accounts and Twitter postings,
and any written op-eds or other direct quotes in print media.
By its very nature, Rostrum is a doctrine in its infancy. It is not
applicable to all interpretive questions because there are interpretive issues
surrounding laws and language that do not generate public debate in social
and other forms of popular media. Also, the goal of Rostrum is to capture
the public understanding of the law at the time of its passage, so its focus is
on how the legislators presented the legislation in the affirmative to voters.
Negative spin and partisan attacks are less relevant to interpreting
ambiguous text. They play no role in Rostrum directly, though they too set
the agenda of the public debate and might very well have radiating effects
as to how the legislation is presented affirmatively.
At this point, Rostrum is primarily conceived on the federal legislation
stage. I am currently assessing different state approaches to the legislative
process and to legislative history, as well as the effect of multistate
coordination of legislative agendas to explore how Rostrum might apply in
the states.
128. Courts are, and should remain, wary of using newspaper accounts to portray legislative
intent; however, most of the discussion about limiting such use centers on accounts written by
journalists, or opinion pieces, as opposed to actual quotations by legislators merely reproduced in
the press. See, e.g., In re Jason W., 837 A.2d 168, 177–78 (Md. 2003) (reviewing both state and
federal courts that are cautious in their use of contemporaneous newspaper accounts to establish
legislative intent).
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A. Incentives
There are several incentives that Rostrum could provide as an accepted
doctrine of interpretation. First, it encourages legislators to communicate to
the electorate about policy against a background of judicial monitoring.
Ideally, the Court’s monitoring function is subtle; the Court merely intends
to hold the legislature to its public statements. But the monitoring plays a
vital role in restoring trust between the electorate and the legislative branch
and ultimately strengthens separation of powers.129 Any communication
puts voters on proper notice about legislation and policy as well, which has
normative benefits beyond separation of powers.130 Finally, through
describing and categorizing Rostrum as a principle, the Court is provided a
framework for using public statements and public debate which plays a
crucial contextualizing role in interpretation already.
The Rostrum Principle might create the following incentives for
Congress: either (1) make Congress less likely to engage in misleading
spin of pending legislation because of the awareness that the Court will
hold the legislation accountable to the spin, or (2) ignite even more
political pandering and spin in the hopes of laying groundwork for eventual
interpretation issues. Taking each of these possible incentives in turn, the
Rostrum Principle upholds its normative goal of fostering meaningful and
accountable public debate.
First, application of Rostrum will sound a warning to legislators that
their public comments to various media outlets matter and could influence
later interpretive questions. This merely curbs the lobbyists’ ability to spin
legislation through elected officials.131 If the application of Rostrum chills
public officials’ speech in popular and social media, citizens might have to
work harder to ascertain how their public officials represent them.132
129. See D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671, 719–21
(2013); see also Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael Serota, Translating Fiduciary Principles
into Public Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 91, 92 (2013) (“Part of the appeal of conceiving the political
relationship between representative and represented in fiduciary terms is that it regards politics in
more realistic and textured ways—as a constellation of power relationships in a web of trust and
vulnerability—rather than as a mere social contract no one ever signed.”).
130. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
131. See JOHN A. QUELCH & KATHERINE E. JOCZ, GREATER GOOD: HOW GOOD MARKETING
MAKES FOR BETTER DEMOCRACY 175, 273–74 (2007). Clearly, Rostrum does nothing to curb
unelected persons spouting talking points and spin, but the voters are on more notice that such
punditry is based on special interests, whereas elected officials carry with them a veneer of public
interest goals, which renders their spin much more dangerous.
132. See Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Substance of the New Legal Process, 77 CALIF. L. REV.
919, 936 (1989) (“If, as the economic model of legislation suggests, statutes are nothing more than
memorializations of bargains struck by (unelected) interest groups, then enforcing the legislature’s
will means nothing more than enforcing the will of the relevant interest groups. If so, the force of
the positivistic premise is considerably weakened; after all, why should we prefer the will of a group
of self-interested pressure groups to the will of judges?”); see also John O. McGinnis & Charles W.
Mulaney, Judging Facts Like Law, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 69, 130 (2008) (stating that courts should
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However unlikely it is that the average voter will engage in research of the
Congressional Record and the corresponding absence of debate that might
occur if media is somehow weakened, applying Rostrum is arguably better
than allowing unaccountable statements to set the terms of any public
debate.
Alternatively, scholars could argue that the use of Rostrum will only
make the current echo chamber louder as special interest groups fight to
have their spin encoded in the public debate for future litigation
purposes.133 While a valid fear, and one that could potentially skew the
public debate based on access to media (assuming that those interests with
the most money continue to enjoy the most access to media and thus have
the loudest voice), there is the corresponding consequence that the Court
will echo the spin.134 At the very least, Rostrum encourages public debate
to center on the actual policy discussion rather than on a false public
benefit that cloaks a private interest. In the midst of ambiguity between the
stated public interest and the unstated private benefit, the Court will give
preference to the stated public interest.135 In other words, an elected official
must take care to market pending legislation exactly as the elected official
intends the judiciary to interpret the legislation.136
B. Possible Stumbling Blocks
There are some problems that might arise with the application of the
Rostrum Principle. The first problem is a practical one: It might make
interpretation messy at first, as litigants struggle to organize and cite to
public statements. There is little reason to scrap the whole enterprise
however, as courts have shown themselves capable of sorting through such
evidence even though scholars have long made the same arguments against
legislative history.137
be able to make factual findings regardless of whether Congress has expressly made findings).
133. See Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 361, 412 (2004) (“Without transparency, agents gain less from adopting positions that
resonate with immediate popular passions, so transparency may exacerbate the effects of
decisionmaking pathologies that sometimes grip mobilized publics.”); see also Schacter, supra note
44, at 145 (“[A]ssigning a central place to media sources invites strategic behavior on the part of
partisans in the initiative battle, such as attempts to fill the airwaves and the larger public record
with characterizations and claims intended to influence subsequent judicial interpretation.”).
134. See Staszewski, supra note 57, at 1290–92.
135. For more on this outcome and why it differs sharply from textualism, see Bell, supra note
34, at 20–23.
136. See Staszewski, supra note 57, at 1289 (“[D]eliberative accountability is premised on a
conviction that it is more productive to debate the merits of particular policy choices, rather than
trying to ascertain or impugn the motives of those who have taken a position.”).
137. See Anita S. Krishnakumar, The Anti-Messiness Principle in Statutory Interpretation, 87
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1465, 1512–13, 1516–17 (2012); see also Manning, supra note 26, at 732
(“[I]f a court relies on the legislative history for contextual information (not of the committee’s or
sponsor’s own design), it must take care to verify the accuracy of the reporting; otherwise, judicial
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Slightly more problematic for a Rostrum application is that the
Principle rests on a possibly unrealistic premise, which assumes a direct
relationship between the passage of any particular law and a subsequent
vote on a lawmaker’s retention.138 This premise may very well be
somewhat weak. However, we must assume that votes matter when
designing institutional accountability. This is especially true when
designing doctrine intended as democracy-forcing; it is imperative that
such doctrines rest on the premise that most empowers the electorate to
vote based on actual information.
The largest stumbling block to the Rostrum Principle is accounting for
the necessary simplicity of a five minute appearance on the Daily Show or
even the mere 140 characters allowed per tweet. In some ways, this
stumbling block highlights the problem in itself: the fact that legislators
speak in a different language to constituents in the public forum than they
do when wearing their drafting hats.139 In some cases this reality might
make statements inapplicable to the interpretation process because they
will not provide the electorate enough information to hold the legislator
accountable for a certain interpretation. Unless the public statement
evidences clear intent to change the law, one way to solve this problem is
to narrowly use Rostrum.140 In this way, Rostrum is similar to a clear
statement rule, but instead pays attention to Congress’s clear statements to
the public. There are and will continue to be times where the clear public
message is belied by the text, and that message, even if simplified by the
constraints of the medium, can and should shed light on ambiguous textual
language.
Finally, there is the problem of the temporal element of compromise, or
the realities of the legislative process.141 In other words, what if a legislator
spins a law a certain way for a month but, in a last minute compromise,
edits the text slightly?142 Does Rostrum then undercut the legislative
reliance on such legislative history would simply give committees or sponsors an indirect way to
‘say what the law is’ through a selectively tailored account of the historical background. This
possibility, however, does not require the blanket exclusion of legislative history from judicial
consideration. When a party prepares a brief in litigation or a professor writes a law review article, a
court is capable of evaluating the persuasiveness of the author’s contentions on the merits, even
though that author may have an agenda.”).
138. See, e.g., ROBERT A. BERNSTEIN, ELECTIONS, REPRESENTATION, AND CONGRESSIONAL
VOTING BEHAVIOR: THE MYTH OF CONSTITUENCY CONTROL 104–05 (1989).
139. Nourse, supra note 10, at 1128–29, 1131–33.
140. This is similar to the hypothetical application to the Gonzales case. See supra Part III; see
also Schacter, supra note 44, at 128–30 (noting the risk of abuse when public statements are
unclear).
141. See, e.g., Vermeule, supra note 133, at 412–13 (discussing the need for bargaining in the
legislative process and the concern that too much public accountability might chill flexibility in
bargaining).
142. See McNollgast, supra note 62, at 7–8 (examining how signaling from legislators can aid
the judiciary in following the twists and turns of coalition building in the legislative process).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss5/1

28

Widman: The Rostrum Principle: Why the Boundaries of the Public Forum Mat

2013]

THE ROSTRUM PRINCIPLE

1475

process? Arguably, no. What Rostrum does is incentivize the legislator to
keep constituents abreast of last minute changes. If the legislator does not
want to enforce the last minute change then arguably the party that does
will carry the burden to convey the change to the public.143 If no legislators
want the last minute change available to the public, then the Court merely
curbs abusive process by not allowing such private drafting to stand.
Moreover, Congress should record any last minute compromises in the
Congressional Record. Rostrum is not necessarily proffered to trump the
Congressional Record. Rather, the inclusion of the public sphere and the
pre-enforcement marketing of legislation add more context to both the
traditional legislative history as well as the ambiguous text.
CONCLUSION
The debate about whether courts should engage legislative history when
interpreting statutes has come full circle. The Rostrum Principle, however,
is not a mere expansion of legislative history in the traditional sense.
Instead, the Rostrum Principle attempts to make the law on extratextual
sources more coherent while also recasting such use as reflective of the
presentation of the legislation in the public sphere. Operating under the
premise that legislators are representatives of the people and are required to
account to the people for their legislative acts, Rostrum merely enlarges the
public sphere through which such accounting takes place. It is a legal
fiction to enshrine the halls of Congress as the bastion of public debate
while turning a blind eye to the parallel public debate on popular and social
media. Because elected officials carry a veneer of trust, it is particularly
misleading when an elected official uses the media to disseminate a publicregarding spin of legislation and then drafts or votes for something
containing a hidden private benefit.
The Rostrum Principle creates a new institutional framework where the
judicial practice of deferring to the cultural debate as expressed through the
public sphere for purposes of interpreting ambiguity in turn has the
normative effect of reinvigorating trust and restoring democratic
engagement and accountability of the legislative process. Since the
marketing of legislation in popular and social media changed dramatically
in recent years, Rostrum is a tool that is just now coming into its own.
143. See Bell, supra note 34, at 83 (“Just as each legislator has a duty to make herself aware of
the statutory text and its meaning in ordinary English usage, under the public justification approach
each individual legislator also has a duty to make herself aware of the public justification offered for
the statute, and to vote on the basis of that public justification. Accordingly, if the legislator votes
for the statute without dissenting from the public justification, she should be viewed as
constructively assenting to that public justification. The legislator who fails to familiarize herself
with the public justification for a statute, or fails to challenge a public justification that she privately
considers inaccurate, has not acquitted her duty as a legislator. Her actual views of the statute’s
rationale are irrelevant because she failed to meet her obligation to address the statute’s public
justification.”).
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More empirical work is needed to capture the relationship between
particular legislative histories through popular media and resulting
interpretive issues, as well as a greater understanding of the long-term
institutional dynamics that might affect the application of the Rostrum
Principle.
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